Architecture and access boundaries
Service placement
The Fujitsu Esprimo D958 runs Proxmox VE. Debian LXC containers separate the documentation service, Forgejo, the Actions runner and network-facing components. Container separation is an operational boundary, not a claim that the whole platform has been security-audited.
| Role | Responsibility |
|---|---|
| Forgejo | Git repositories, web interface and Actions job coordination |
| Actions runner | Docker-based documentation build jobs |
| Documentation container | Private documentation backend and a separate public portfolio backend |
| Tunnel connector container | Outbound cloudflared connector; also hosts existing Caddy and NetBird components |
| Tailscale subnet router | Private administrative reachability into the homelab |
Other private applications exist, including Nextcloud. They are not published as demonstrations through these portfolio routes.
Public application traffic
Visitor
-> HTTPS -> Cloudflare
-> existing outbound tunnel
-> cloudflared connector
+-> HTTP -> nginx public portfolio backend
+-> HTTP -> Forgejo backend
The two hostnames select different application backends:
| Hostname | Purpose |
|---|---|
| docs.ovelab.eu | Public English portfolio, with a separate content directory |
| repo.ovelab.eu | Forgejo web interface and Git over HTTPS |
DNS routes each published name to the same named tunnel. The tunnel application routes then select the backend. A DNS record is not a substitute for the application route.
Caddy is used elsewhere but is not an intermediary in the public documentation path shown here. The existing Caddy configuration was not rebuilt to publish the portfolio.
Private administration
Administrator -> Tailscale -> private homelab services
The host management panel and private documentation are not portfolio endpoints. Private administration remains separate from public application access. Public SSH access was not added as part of the Forgejo publication.
Documentation delivery
Approved source commit -> Forgejo Actions queue
<- runner polls for work
Runner -> Docker image build -> SSH image transfer
-> restricted deployment receiver -> candidate check
-> nginx backend switch
This is the implemented private documentation pipeline. The initial public portfolio is a separate static release; an automated public release pipeline has not been demonstrated.
Trust boundaries and limits
- Visitor HTTPS terminates at Cloudflare; the selected internal backends use HTTP.
- The connector makes an outbound tunnel connection. This publication did not require new inbound router port forwarding.
- That does not establish that all other IPv4 or IPv6 inbound paths are closed.
- Repository visibility is enforced by Forgejo, independently of tunnel routing.
- The runner's Docker engine access is highly privileged. Untrusted workflows must not be treated as safe merely because the runner is in a container.
- Private repository checks cover observed requests, not an exhaustive application authorization audit.